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Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.:
Ignoring the First Amendment Privilege
[I]t must be obvious to the plainest minds, that opinions and in-
ferences, and conjectural observations, are not only in many
cases inseparable from the facts, but may often be more the ob-
jects of prosecution than the facts themselves .... [I]t is mani-
festly impossible to punish the intent to bring those who
administer the government into disrepute or contempt, without
striking at the right of freely discussing public characters and
measures ....
James Madison'
I. INTRODUCTION
"The public will be shocked to learn ... that ... in the United
States of America a local politician could collect hundreds of
thousands of dollars in a libel case solely because he was criticized
harshly and called a liar by a local newspaper. '"2 Yet this nearly
came to pass in Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.3
The manner in which the Illinois Supreme Court prevented this
result, however, has raised confusing and alarming constitutional
questions.
This Note examines the important background cases that shaped
the first amendment issues raised in Costello. The appellate and
supreme court opinions in Costello are then discussed and ana-
lyzed. Additionally, this Note examines the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Milkovich v. Lorain JournaI Co.4 and
assesses its impact. Finally, this Note concludes that the decisions
in Costello and Milkovich fail to recognize key issues central to
freedoms guaranteed under the first amendment.
1. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 575 (2d ed. 1836) (quoted in Costello v. Capital Cities Commu-
nications, Inc., 153 Ill. App. 3d 956, 976-77, 505 N.E.2d 701, 714 (5th Dist. 1987)
(Steigmann, J., dissenting), rev'd, 125 Ill. 2d 402, 532 N.E.2d 790 (1988)).
2. Costello, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 505 N.E.2d at 728 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
3. 153 Ill. App. 3d 956, 972-73, 505 N.E.2d 701, 711 (5th Dist. 1987), rev'd, 125 Ill.
2d 402, 532 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
4. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Defamation and the First Amendment
A defamatory communication is one that tends to harm an-
other's reputation in the eyes of the community or deters third per-
sons from associating with him.' Defamation consists of the twin
torts of libel and slander.6 Historically, slander involved utter-
ances, whereas libel concerned written or printed words.7 Libel
has since been expanded to include physical embodiment, such as
hanging a person in effigy.
The first amendment limits a plaintiff's right to recover in a def-
amation action.9 Thus, a defamation plaintiff's common law rights
necessarily must collide with his critic's constitutional privilege.' 0
This constitutional question is especially acute when a publication
criticizes a government official's performance of duty."
R The Actual Malice Standard
The competing interests of a defamation plaintiff and his critics
were at issue in the landmark case New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.12 In New York Times, an Alabama official brought a libel ac-
tion against the newspaper and several civil rights leaders. 13 A
full-page newspaper advertisement sponsored by an African-Amer-
ican political group criticized Montgomery city officials for their
handling of several racial incidents.' 4 The advertisement referred
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
6. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
7. Id. § 112.
8. Id.
9. The first amendment provides in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...... U.S. CONST. amend. I. This
protection has been extended to state governments by incorporation under the fourteenth
amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
10. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974) (noting the Court's
lengthy struggle to reconcile defamation law and the first amendment); see also infra text
accompanying notes 41-60.
11. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964) ("[i]t is as much
[the citizen-critic's] duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer!'); see also
infra text accompanying notes 12-40. The common law defense of fair comment and
criticism historically has afforded great protection to critical opinions about matters of
public interest, including criticism of public officials. As long as the opinion had a basis in
fact and was not made with an intent to harm, the opinion was protected. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment a (1977).
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13. Id. at 256.
14. Id. at 256-57. The complete text of the advertisement, as it originally appeared in
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to Sullivan, a city commissioner, only indirectly, 5 and contained
numerous factual errors."
The trial judge instructed the jury that the published statements
were libelous per se. " Under these circumstances, the plaintiff was
required neither to plead nor to prove general damages to his repu-
tation, because such damages were presumed under Alabama
law.'" Therefore, the jury was limited to determining whether the
defendants published the advertisement and, if so, whether the
statements were "of and concerning" the plaintiff."' The jury de-
cided both of these issues in Sullivan's favor and awarded him
$500,000 in damages.20 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.2 '
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in New York Times2 2 stated
that libel can claim no "talismanic immunity" from first amend-
ment standards.23 Rather, the first amendment was fashioned to
ensure the uninhibited exchange of ideas in the political realm.24
This purpose, according to Justice Brennan, is based upon the un-
derlying assumption that " 'right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
the New York Times on March 29, 1960, is included as an appendix to the majority
opinion. Id. at 292.
15. Id. at 257-58. Specifically, the advertisement criticized local police activity, in-
cluding several arrests of Dr. Martin Luther King and the disruption of a nonviolent
student demonstration. Id. at 256-58. The plaintiff, who supervised the Montgomery po-
lice department, alleged that the words "police" and "arrest" referred to him in his offi-
cial capacity. Id. at 257-58.
16. Id. at 257-59. For example, the advertisement claimed that Dr. King had been
arrested seven times for minor offenses. In fact, he had only been arrested four times. Id.
at 258-59. Additionally, the advertisement alleged that students sang "My Country, 'Tis
of Thee" on the steps of the capitol building during a demonstration. In fact, the students
sang the National Anthem. Id.
17. Id. at 262-63. Under Alabama law, published words that tended to injure a per-
son's reputation, charged him with a criminal offense, or tended to bring him into public
contempt, were libelous per se. Id. at 263 (citing New York Times, 273 Ala. 656, 673, 676,
144 So.2d 25, 37, 41 (1962)).
18. Id. at 262.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 256.
21. New York Times, 273 Ala. 656, 687, 144 So. 2d 25, 52 (1962).
22. Before proceeding to the basis of its decision, the majority first disposed of two
contentions asserted to insulate the lower court decisions from constitutional scrutiny.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265. First, the Court held that a state rule of law which
purports to destroy a party's first amendment rights is unconstitutional, even in a civil
case. Id. Second, allegedly libelous statements that are constitutionally protected do not
lose that protection merely because they were made in the form of a published advertise-
ment. Id. at 266.
23. Id. at 269.
24. Id.
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authoritative selection.' "25 Therefore, the case was considered in
the context of the nation's profound commitment to uninhibited
debate on public issues.26 Although such discussion often produces
sharp, caustic attacks on public officials, defamatory content can-
not dissolve the constitutional privilege afforded a critic of official
conduct.27
Similarly, factual error in an allegedly defamatory statement
does not diminish its constitutional protection. 28 Any rule requir-
ing a critic of government to guarantee the truth of his assertions
would undermine the foundations of the first amendment, foster
self-censorship and thereby lessen the effectiveness of public
debate.29
In consideration of these principles, the Court concluded that a
public official seeking damages for defamation must prove that the
statements at issue were made with actual malice. 30 It defined ac-
tual malice as "knowledge that [a statement] was false or reckless
disregard whether it was false or not."'" Therefore, the case was
reversed and remanded because it was not clear whether the Ala-
bama courts applied this standard.32
C. The Constitutional Privilege
1. Absolute Protection
In his concurring opinion in New York Times,33 Justice Black
stated that the first amendment provides more protection to the
25. Id. at 270 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 273.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 279.
30. Id. at 279-80.
31. Id. at 280. Four years later, in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the
Court refined the actual malice standard. Justice White, writing for the majority, ex-
plained that "reckless disregard" is determined, not by what a reasonably prudent person
would do, but rather by whether the defamation defendant subjectively "entertained seri-
ous doubts" as to the veracity of his published statements. Id. at 731.
32. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284. Specifically, the trial judge failed to instruct the
jury to differentiate between general and punitive damages. Id. Therefore, the Court was
unable to determine whether the damage award was punitive or compensatory, and thus,
whether actual malice had been proven or merely presumed. Id. However, the Court's
independent review indicated that the evidence: (1) failed to show actual malice with "the
convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands," and (2) did not support
the "finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made 'of and concerning' [the
plaintiff]." Id. at 286, 288.
33. Id. at 293-97 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Douglas joined in the concurrence.
Id. at 293.
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press than the majority conceded.34 Specifically, he stated that the
first and fourteenth amendments prohibit state interference with a
citizen's right to criticize official conduct.35 The concurrence char-
acterized the criticism of government officials as an "absolute, un-
conditional constitutional right."36  Moreover, Justice Black
considered discussion of public affairs and officials precisely the
type of speech that the first amendment was designed to protect.3
"To punish the exercise of this right ... or to penalize it through
libel judgments is to abridge or shut off discussion of the very kind
most needed." 38
Justice Black reasoned that a more faithful first amendment in-
terpretation required a holding that left the people and press free to
discuss public issues with impunity. 9 He concluded that the first
amendment, at minimum, guarantees an absolute right to freely
discuss government and public affairs."
2. Shifting the Standard
Ten years later, however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,4 the
Court limited the constitutional privilege recognized by the major-
ity in New York Times. In Gertz, a Chicago policeman shot and
killed a youth.4 2 The officer was convicted of second degree mur-
der.43 The youth's family retained Gertz to represent them in civil
litigation against the policeman.44
A politically conservative magazine reported that Gertz was
part of a "frame up" of the policeman in his criminal trial.45 The
34. Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
35. Id. (Black, J., concurring).
36. Id. (Black, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 296-97 (Black, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 297 (Black, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 296 (Black, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 297 (Black, J., concurring). In the decade following New York Times, the
Court wrestled with the issue raised by Justice Black: the extent of the first amendment
privilege. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), a majority of the Jus-
tices agreed that the actual malice standard should extend beyond public officials to
"public figures." Id. at 162-63 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Later, in Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971), a plurality of the Court extended the actual
malice standard to defamation actions brought by private individuals, provided the mat-
ter at issue was one of public or general interest, but this notion was subsequently re-
jected. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974); see also infra text
accompanying notes 41-60.
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
42. Id. at 325.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
19901
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magazine alleged that Gertz was involved with communist organi-
zations, and that the frame-up, which included false testimony at
the officer's trial, was part of a conspiracy to undermine the au-
thority of the Chicago police.' Gertz filed suit against the maga-
zine's publisher in federal court, alleging that the article injured his
reputation as a lawyer and citizen.47 Although a jury awarded
Gertz $50,000, 48 the district court entered judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict in favor of the publisher, because the court deter-
mined that the allegedly libelous statements were not made with
actual malice.49 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed,50 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider
the extent of a publisher's constitutional privilege.5
The Supreme Court concluded that the actual malice standard
applies only when the person allegedly defamed is a public official
or public figure.52 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, rea-
soned that public persons have access to the media and may thus
counteract false statements, whereas private individuals ordinarily
are accorded no such protection.3 Moreover, because a public offi-
cial or figure voluntarily subjects himself to close scrutiny, he ac-
cepts a greater risk of defamatory injury.54 A private individual
accepts no such risk, thus foreclosing any first amendment privi-
lege otherwise afforded a publisher or broadcaster."
Therefore, the Court held that, short of imposing liability with-
46. Id.
47. Id. at 327.
48. Gertz, 322 F. Supp. 997, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
49. Id. at 1000. The district court applied the actual malice standard even though
Gertz was not a public official or public figure. Id. The court apparently anticipated the
reasoning of the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971).
See supra note 40. But the Supreme Court in Gertz disagreed with the Rosenbloom plural-
ity, and held that the actual malice standard applies only to defamation plaintiffs who are
public officials or public figures. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46.
50. Gertz, 471 F.2d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 1972).
51. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
52. Id. at 342-43. The Court defined a public official as one who holds a government
office. Id. at 342. A public figure is determined by "the notoriety of [one's] achievements
or the vigor and success with which [one] seek[s] the public's attention . Id.
53. Id. at 344.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 345. Although the plaintiff was a former Chicago city official and appeared
at the coroner's inquest following the shooting, the Court did not consider him a to be
public official or figure: "We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participation in
community and professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes." Id at
352. This is an apparent departure from precedent. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (football coach at the University of Georgia was a "public
figure" for purposes of recovering damages for a defamation alleging that he was involved
in fixing a football game). In a case consolidated for decision with Butts, Associated Press
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out fault, states may define appropriate standards of liability for
defamatory statements made by a publisher or broadcaster about a
private individual. 56 States cannot, however, allow recovery of pre-
sumed or punitive damages in such a case without a showing of
actual malice. 7
Although Gertz apparently limited the media's first amendment
protection in defamation actions by private individuals, it may
have expanded constitutional protection under a new standard. In
dicta, the Court stated, "[w]e begin with the common ground.
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its cor-
rection not on the conscience of judges, but on the competition of
other ideas."5 8 Subsequent lower courts have gleaned from this
statement the proposition that the first amendment unconditionally
protects statements of opinion.59 Thus, only if the court finds an
allegedly defamatory statement to be an assertion of fact must it
apply the actual malice test and inquire into the subjective state of
mind of the statement's publisher.10
v. Walker, the Justices unanimously agreed that a politically active former Army general
was a "public figure" for purposes of applying the actual malice standard).
Nevertheless, subsequent cases originating in Illinois indicate that "public official or
figure" is a rather broad category, encompassing a wide variety of individuals. See, e.g.,
Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 403 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989)
(elementary school principal); Reed v. Northwestern Publishing Co., 124 Ill. 2d 495, 508,
530 N.E.2d 474, 480 (1988) (police officer); Wanless v. Rothballer, 115 111. 2d 158, 167,
503 N.E.2d 316, 320 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987) (village attorney); Catalano
v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 149, 155, 419 N.E.2d 350, 352, 355 (1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 911 (1981) (aldermen); Weinel v. Monken, 134 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1042, 481 N.E.2d
776, 778 (5th Dist. 1985) (owner of engineering firm having public works contract with
township); Matchett v. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1011, 467 N.E.2d 271,
277 (1st Dist. 1984), appeal denied (not published), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 929 (1987)
(candidate for public office). But see, Van Duyn v. Smith, 173 Ill. App. 3d 523, 532, 527
N.E.2d 1005, 1011 (3d Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 124 Ill. 2d 562, 535 N.E.2d 922 (1989),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3217 (1989) (executive director of an abortion clinic was not a
public official or figure).
56. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
57. Id. at 349.
58. Id. at 339-40. The "common ground" referred to an area in which the Justices all
apparently agreed: absolute constitutional protection for statements of opinion. See id. at
338-39.
59. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Owen v. Carr, 113 111. 2d 273, 280, 497 N.E.2d 1145, 1148
(1986). But see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990) (explicitly
rejecting absolute constitutional protection of opinion). All three of these cases are dis-
cussed extensively in this Note. See infra text accompanying notes: 61-69, 86-99, 174-204.
60. See supra note 31 for an explanation of the United States Supreme Court's "ac-
tual malice" test. The High Court has decided several other cases dealing with statements
of opinion that bear mention. In Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6
(1970), a newspaper accused the plaintiff of "blackmailing" a municipality in order to get
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3. Determining the Boundaries
In Olman v. Evans,6' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit attempted to define the boundaries of this new
standard. 62  The Ollman court found that Gertz "fundamentally
changed" the privilege accorded written opinions on areas of pub-
lic interest.63 Specifically, the court recognized that the Gertz dicta
provided statements of opinion with absolute constitutional immu-
nity from defamation actions." Thus, Gertz required courts to dis-
tinguish opinion from fact in order to fulfill this first amendment
mandate.65
The Olman court noted, however, that distinguishing opinion
from fact was a difficult task, and Gertz provided no guidance on
how to make this distinction. 6  Accordingly, the court developed
four factors to determine whether an "average reader" would con-
sider a statement to be an opinion. 67 The Olman factors examine a
statement's precision; verifiability, i.e., whether the statement is ca-
pable of being objectively characterized as true or false; literary
context; and broader, social context. 68 Despite the difficulty in de-
zoning variances. The Court stated that a statement of opinion does not lose constitu-
tional protection if it is in the form of a rhetorical hyperbole or a vigorous epithet. Id. at
14. Similarly, in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974), the Court held that a labor union's use of the word "scab" with
reference to letters carriers who refused to join the union was merely loose, figurative
language and not intended to be fact.
61. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
62. Ollman, a political science professor at New York University, brought this defa-
mation action against two nationally syndicated columnists. Id. at 971-72. The colum-
nists, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, co-wrote an article alleging that Ollman was a
Marxist who used the classroom to indoctrinate students in the coming "revolution." Id.
at 972. The issue, according to the court, was whether the column was constitutionally
protected opinion. Id. at 971.
63. Id. at 974.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 975. It is not always an easy task to distinguish a given statement as opin-
ion. Two commentators have suggested that "[a] statement can be protected as opinion if
the meaning is so vague and imprecise that it is subject to many interpretations. However,
if the meaning of a statement is sufficiently definite to convey fact, the statement cannot
be considered to be an opinion." K. MIDDLETON & B. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF
PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 157 (1988).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 979.
68. Id. Judge Bork, concurring in the result, rejected the "rigid doctrinal framework"
adopted by the court. Id. at 993 (Bork, J., concurring). In his estimation, statements such
as those made by the defendants in Olman do not always fit into "compartments labelled
'opinion' and 'fact' . . . ... Id. at 994 (Bork, J., concurring). Rather, such statements
should be subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny to ensure that cases about the types of
speech and writing essential to a vigorous first amendment do not reach the jury." Id. at
997 (Bork, J., concurring). Under Judge Bork's "balancing test," a court would examine
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termining what an opinion actually is, most courts follow the dicta
in Gertz and afford broad deference to statements of opinion. 69
4. Fact Versus Opinion in Illinois
The Illinois courts have also struggled with the opinion versus
fact dichotomy. In Catalano v. Pechous,70 the Illinois Supreme
Court discussed constitutional and common law issues that fre-
quently arise in a defamation setting. In Catalano, seven of eight
Berwyn, Illinois alderman brought a defamation suit against three
defendants, including Pechous, a city clerk, for statements alleg-
edly made during a council meeting. 7I At the meeting in question,
Pechous purportedly remarked to third persons that, in awarding a
municipal trash collection contract, "two hundred forty pieces of
silver changed hands-thirty for each alderman. ' 72 The statement
was subsequently published in the Chicago Sun-Times.73 The trial
court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, but
the appellate court reversed as to Pechous.74
On appeal, the supreme court stated that a public official may
recover in a defamation suit only if he establishes that the allegedly
defamatory statement was false and was made with actual malice.75
Pechous made no representations regarding the truth of his state-
ment. 76 He did contend, however, that his statement was not de-
famatory, because the plaintiffs failed adequately to prove actual
malice.77
In assessing the defamatory nature of Pechous' statement, the
court applied two tests. First, it examined whether the statement
was susceptible to an innocent construction.78 The court ruled
the totality of circumstances to determine whether making the statement in question ac-
tionable would unduly burden free speech or press. Id. (Bork, J., concurring).
69. See K. MIDDLETON & B. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 65, at 163.
70. 83 Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
71. Id. at 149, 419 N.E.2d at 352.
72. Id. at 151, 419 N.E.2d at 353.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 149-50, 419 N.E.2d at 352.
75. Id. at 155, 419 N.E.2d at 355 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964)); see also supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
76. Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 155, 419 N.E.2d at 355.
77. Id. at 156, 419 N.E.2d at 355.
78. Id. at 157, 419 N.E.2d at 356. For a discussion of the Illinois "innocent construc-
tion rule" see Note, Chapski v. Copley Press: Modification of the Illinois Innocent Con-
struction Rule, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 233 (1984). Briefly, under this rule, if a
statement can be interpreted either innocently or as referring to someone else, it will not
be defamatory per se. See also infra text accompanying notes 86-99 for an extended dis-
cussion of the rule.
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that, because the defendant offered no alternative, plausible inter-
pretation to his obvious allusion to Judas' betrayal of Christ, his
statement could not be innocently construed.7 9
The court then addressed whether the statement at issue was
constitutionally protected opinion.80 Specifically, the court recog-
nized that a statement of opinion concerning a public figure gener-
ally receives absolute constitutional protection under Gertz, "quite
apart" from the New York Times standard."' The court also indi-
cated, however, that statements imputing criminal activity are not
protected opinions, but rather statements of fact. 2
The court concluded that Pechous' comment was a statement of
fact imputing criminal activity to the plaintiffs, and was therefore
not entitled to absolute constitutional protection. 3 Moreover, the
court found that the defendant's statement was made, at minimum,
with reckless disregard for its accuracy, thus satisfying the actual
malice requirement.8 4 Accordingly, the defendant's remark was
not constitutionally privileged under either Gertz or New York
Times.8 5
D. The Innocent Construction Rule
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Owen v. Carr, 6 readdressed the
standards to be applied in a common law defamation action.87 In
Owen, an attorney filed a libel action against a law journal pub-
79. Catalano, 83 I11. 2d at 157, 419 N.E.2d at 355-56.
80. Id. at 159, 419 N.E.2d at 356-57.
81. Id. at 159-61, 419 N.E.2d at 356-57 (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publishing
Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980)).
82. Id. at 161, 419 N.E.2d at 357 (citing Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co.,
639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980)). Thus, the court implied that statements in the form of an
opinion may be construed as facts, thereby depriving such statements of absolute consti-
tutional protection. See id. at 159, 419 N.E.2d at 356.
83. Id. at 164, 419 N.E.2d at 359.
84. Id. at 166, 419 N.E.2d at 360.
85. Id. Although Catalano discussed the fact versus opinion dichotomy, it did not
propose criteria for making this determination. The appellate courts, however, have occa-
sionally resorted to the following analysis: " 'A defamatory communication may consist
of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only
if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.' "
See, e.g., Stewart v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 151 I11. App. 3d 888, 891-92, 503 N.E.2d 580,
582 (4th Dist. 1987) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977)) (state-
ment in letter from title insurer to bank, characterizing mortgagor as member of militant
farmers' group, constitutionally was protected opinion under the Restatement test, and
therefore was not actionable).
86. 113 Il. 2d 273, 497 N.E.2d 1145 (1986).
87. Id. at 278, 280, 497 N.E.2d at 1147, 1148.
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lisher.88 A journal article quoted remarks, allegedly made by the
publisher, that characterized the plaintiff as "trying deliberately to
intimidate" judges in cases involving the plaintiff's corporate cli-
ent.89 The plaintiff contended that, because the statements were
naturally harmful to his professional reputation, they constituted
libel per se and were therefore actionable without proof of special
damages. 9°
Without first exploring the defamatory nature of the defendant's
statements, the court examined whether those statements could be
innocently construed.91 Under the innocent construction rule, the
court considers a statement in context and gives its words and im-
plications their "natural and obvious meanings. ' 92 Under such a
construction, a statement will not be actionable per se if it reason-
ably may be interpreted innocently or deemed to refer to someone
other than the plaintiff.93
The Owen court concluded that the defendant's statements were
not libelous per se.94 The court reasoned that the article, consid-
ered in its entirety, could reasonably be construed as an attorney's
biased statement of his client's view of pending litigation, thereby
satisfying the innocent construction rule.95 Additionally, the court
recognized the first amendment protection afforded statements of
opinion under Gertz. 6 Although the court mandated that "the in-
volved language must be considered in context to determine
whether the statement [is] an expression of opinion," it did not
further explore the fact versus opinion dichotomy. 9 Rather, using
essentially the same reasoning it had applied in determining that
the statements could be innocently construed, the court summarily
concluded that the defendant's remarks were opinions. 98 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the statements at issue were entitled to
88. Id. at 275, 497 N.E.2d at 1146.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 277, 497 N.E.2d at 1147. Illinois has adopted the common law model in
which four classes of statements are actionable per se: (1) words imputing commission of
a criminal offense, (2) words imputing infection with a communicable disease, (3) words
imputing inability to perform or lack of professional integrity in discharging the duties of
public office or employment and (4) words prejudicing an individual in his profession or
trade. Fried v. Jacobson, 99 Ill. 2d 24, 27, 457 N.E.2d 392, 394 (1983).
91. Owen, 113 Il1. 2d at 278, 497 N.E.2d at 1147.
92. Id. at 279, 497 N.E.2d at 1147-48.
93. Id. at 279, 497 N.E.2d at 1148.
94. Id. at 282, 497 N.E.2d at 1149.
95. Id. at 280, 497 N.E.2d at 1148.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 280-81, 497 N.E.2d at 1148.
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constitutional protection and susceptible to an innocent construc-
tion, thereby precluding recovery. 99 Approximately two years af-
ter deciding Owen, the Illinois Supreme Court reconsidered these
questions in Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.'o
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Factual Setting of Costello
A 1980 amendment to the Local Mass Transit District Act'01
granted the governing boards of St. Clair, Madison, and Monroe
Counties authority to create transit districts.1 1 2 County retail sales
taxes of up to 0.25% were to fund these districts."0 3
A local newspaper, the News-Democrat, vehemently opposed the
creation of a transit district in St. Clair County without a public
referendum on the sales tax issue."o Accordingly, the News-Demo-
crat sought to endorse a candidate who shared these views in the
upcoming election for county board chairman.105
Jerry Costello, a candidate for chairman, met with the newspa-
per's editorial board in September, 1980, to discuss his political
views and the possible endorsement of his candidacy. 10 6 At this
meeting, Costello told the editorial board that he would oppose
"any new tax during his first term without a referendum."107 Ap-
parently satisfied with Costello's views on the transit issue, the
News-Democrat endorsed his candidacy for county board chair-
man. An October 17, 1980, editorial praised Costello's overall abil-
ity and stated that he pledged to oppose the imposition of any new
tax absent a referendum.' Costello won the November
99. Id. at 282, 497 N.E.2d at 1149.
100. 125 111. 2d 402, 532 N.E.2d 790 (1988), rev'g, 153 Ill. App. 3d 956, 505 N.E.2d
701 (5th Dist. 1987).
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll 2/3, paras. 351-59 (1987).
102. Id. paras. 352(i), 353; Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 407, 532 N.E.2d at 791-92. A mass
transit district is defined by the Act as a municipal corporation having right of eminent
domain and power to contract for public mass transportation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 11
2/3, para. 353 (1987).
103. Id.; Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 407, 532 N.E.2d at 792.
104. Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 407, 532 N.E.2d at 792. An editorial in the September 15,
1980, edition of the News-Democrat expressed this view. Costello, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 959,
505 N.E.2d at 702-03.
105. Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 407-08, 532 N.E.2d at 792.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 408, 532 N.E.2d at 792. The facts surrounding this meeting were disputed
at trial. Two defendants testified that Costello promised to "vigorously use [his] political
influence" and "do everything possible" to oppose the transit tax. Id.
108. Id. at 408-09, 532 N.E.2d at 792.
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election. ,o
The hotly disputed transit issue was on the agenda of Costello's
first meeting as chairman on December 29, 1980.110 Prior to the
meeting, Costello arranged to have a motion presented and secon-
ded which, if carried, would table the transit district question until
the county board held an advisory referendum in the spring.11
But Costello's ploy failed. The board overwhelmingly defeated the
motion to table the transit issue and subsequently adopted a resolu-
tion creating a transit district.1 1 2 Costello did not vote against the
resolution and made no statements in opposition.' 3
When News-Democrat officials learned of the resolution to create
a transit district, Richard Hargraves, the editorial page editor, pre-
pared two columns criticizing the board's decision.I 4 These edito-
rials were published December 31, 1980, on the "OPINIONS"
page within a box labelled "Our Viewpoint." I 1 5 The second edito-
rial carried the headline "Costello Blew his First Chance" and read
as follows:
Jerry Costello lied to us. There's no nicer way to put it; he simply
lied. And, when he lied to us, he lied to you. He said he was
going to be a tough county board chairman, especially when
board members wanted to spend taxpayers' money. He said he
would militantly oppose the implementation of any new tax with-
out first seeking the voters' approval through a referendum. He
said he would lead the County Board down the proper paths,
protecting the rights of the taxpayers. Well, he lied. He didn't do
any of those things Monday night, thereby breaking his most sa-
cred campaign promise at his very first meeting. The County
Board had an opportunity to conduct a binding referendum, ask-
ing you if you wanted to pay a new sales tax to support the Bi-
State bus system. That's the very thing Costello pledged he
would do. He had promised, in the strongest possible terms, that
109. Id. at 409, 532 N.E.2d at 792.
110. Id. A News-Democrat reporter was present at the meeting. Id. at 409, 532
N.E.2d at 793.
111. Id. at 409, 532 N.E.2d at 792-93.
112. Id. at 409-10, 532 N.E.2d at 793. The motion to table was defeated by a vote of
22 to 6. The resolution creating a transit district was adopted by the same margin. Id.
113. Id. at 410, 532 N.E.2d at 793. Costello testified at trial that the board chairman
was restricted to the role of parliamentarian and thus was prohibited from speaking out
on substantive matters before the board. Id. at 409-10, 532 N.E.2d at 793. Additionally,
Costello testified that, prior to the meeting, he urged at least nine board members to reject
the transit district resolution. Seven of the board members verified this testimony at trial.
Id. at 418, 532 N.E.2d at 797.
114. Id. at 410, 532 N.E.2d at 793.
115. Id. at 411, 532 N.E.2d at 793.
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he would let the voters decide. But when the time came to make
a decision, he was up there sitting on his gavel.
Some leader! You couldn't tell him from any other politician in
the bunch. He did absolutely nothing to protect your interests.
To say we're disappointed is too mild; we're irate. We supported
Costello's election because of what he said to us. We told you
what he said and how we thought he was different from the run-
of-the-mill, Touchette-dominated Democrats of the past. Now
we wonder if he didn't lie to you. Maybe Costello isn't different.
Maybe Costello didn't mean any of the things he said. Maybe his
opponent, Republican Larry Reinneck, was right when he said
Jerry Costello was nothing more than another patronage-ori-
ented political hack. How are we supposed to tell otherwise?
Jerry Costello asked for a chance to prove himself and, in his
very first meeting, he blew it. Just think, we've got two more
years of the Costello brand of lying leadership. Doesn't that thrill
you?
Richard N. Hargraves" 6
One week after the News-Democrat published this editorial, Cos-
tello filed a libel action against Hargraves and the publishing com-
pany, alleging that the following statements in the editorial were
defamatory:
(1) 'Jerry Costello lied to us'; (2) 'There's no nicer way to put it,
he [Costello] simply lied'; (3) 'And when he [Costello] lied to us,
he lied to you'; (4) 'Well, he [Costello] lied'; (5) 'But when the
time came to make a decision, he [Costello] was up there sitting
on his gavel'; (6) 'He [Costello] did absolutely nothing to protect
your interests'; (7) 'Just think, we've got two more years of the
Costello brand of lying leadership."' 7
The circuit court dismissed Costello's complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. I s The appellate court reversed and re-
manded, holding that Costello's complaint sufficiently stated a
116. Id. at 411-12, 532 N.E.2d at 794. The entire "OPINIONS" page of the Decem-
ber 31, 1980, edition of the News-Democrat, as it originally appeared, is reprinted at Cos-
tello, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 1002, 505 N.E.2d at 730 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
Hargraves' initial draft was relatively tame. Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 411, 532 N.E.2d at
793. The editorial appeared in its final form at the insistence of the publisher, Darwin
Wiles, who characterized Costello as a liar and wanted Hargraves to make the editorial
"more vigorously critical," so that Costello "would not think he 'could get away with this
type of thing.., again.'" Id.
Five days after publication, Costello sent a letter to the editor justifying his inaction at
the board meeting. Id. at 412, 532 N.E.2d at 794. The News-Democrat elected not to
publish Costello's rebuttal because he threatened a lawsuit against the newspaper. Id. at
413, 532 N.E.2d at 794.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 406, 532 N.E.2d at 791.
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cause of action for libel per se." 9 On remand, the trial judge
awarded Costello $450,000 in actual damages against both defend-
ants and $600,000 in punitive damages against the publishing com-
pany.120 The defendants appealed.' 2'
B. The Appellate Court Opinions
1. The Majority
On appeal, the defendants argued that the editorial was constitu-
tionally protected opinion, The majority, however, rejected this
contention. 2 3 The court stated that the Ollman reasoning did not
simplify or improve the reliability of judicial analysis in a defama-
tion case because it is difficult to draw a "bright line" between fact
and opinion.1 24
Instead, the court chose to apply the innocent construction rule,
and stated two reasons for preferring this approach. 2 5 First, the
court found that Illinois Supreme Court precedent did not support
absolute constitutional protection of opinion. 26 For example, ac-
cording to the court, Catalano v. Pechous 27 may be read as critical
of this standard. 2  Further, the court contended that Owen v.
Carr 129 was decided solely on the basis of the innocent construc-
tion rule; Owen's apparent approval of absolute constitutional pro-
tection for statements of opinion was mere dicta. 30 Finally, the
court criticized the foundation of absolute protection for opinions,
finding the standard unrealistic vis-i-vis the innocent construction
rule.13 1
119. Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 111 Il. App. 3d 1009, 1016-17, 445
N.E.2d 13, 19 (5th Dist. 1982).
120. Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 125 Ill. 2d at 406, 532 N.E.2d
at 791.
121. Id. at 407, 532 N.E.2d at 791.
122. Costello, 153 111. App. 3d at 963-65, 505 N.E.2d at 705-06 (citing Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) and Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)).
123. Id. at 966, 505 N.E.2d at 708.
124. Id. at 964-65, 505 N.E.2d at 706.
125. Id. at 966, 505 N.E.2d at 707.
126. Id. at 965, 505 N.E.2d at 706-07.
127. 83 111. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); see also
supra text accompanying notes 70-85.
128. Costello, 153 111. App. 3d at 965, 505 N.E.2d at 707.
129. 113 Ill. 2d 273, 497 N.E.2d 1145 (1986); see also supra text accompanying notes
86-99.
130. Costello, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 966, 505 N.E.2d at 707.
131. Id. at 967, 505 N.E.2d at 708. The court pointed out a potential downfall of the
opinion versus fact test: "Any defendant in any defamation suit.., can always say, 'Why,
I was only expressing an opinion, and that's privileged.' We do not believe the law of
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After reviewing the evidence, the majority reaffirmed its earlier
opinion132 that the editorial was libelous per se.' 3a Additionally,
the court held that the defendants' statements were made with ac-
tual malice and characterized the defendant's language as "a vi-
cious and unwarranted attack" on Costello. ' 34 However, the court
reversed the trial judge's award of punitive damages'35 and reduced
the compensatory damage judgment from $450,000 to $200,000. 136
2. The Dissent
A vigorous dissent by Justice Steigmann criticized the majority's
failure to recognize absolute constitutional protection for state-
ments of opinion.' 37  According to the dissent, Owen mandated
that courts afford this protection to defamation defendants. 3 1
Thus, Justice Steigmann contended, Owen required courts to dis-
defamation should digress so far .... The innocent construction rule does not permit
such an extreme digression." Id.
Although the court rejected the notion of absolute protection for expressions of opin-
ion, it explicitly recognized the actual malice standard. Id. However, the defendants in
Costello could not claim this constitutional privilege because their statements went "well
beyond the bounds of protected criticism." Id.
132. Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 111 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1014, 445 N.E.2d
13, 17 (5th Dist. 1982).
133. Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 153 Ill. App 3d at 967, 505
N.E.2d at 708. The editorial was libelous per se because it imputed to Costello an inabil-
ity to perform or lack of integrity in the discharge of his official duties. Id. This is one of
four common law categories of words which, if falsely communicated, constitute libel per
se. Id. at 967-68, 505 N.E.2d at 708-09; see also supra note 90.
134. Id. at 972-73, 505 N.E.2d at 711.
135. Id. at 974, 505 N.E.2d at 713. An award of both compensatory and punitive
damages is impermissible when the factors used to determine the appropriateness of puni-
tive damages are identical to the elements required for recovery of compensatory dam-
ages. Id. at 974, 505 N.E.2d at 712-13 (citing Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp.,
111 111. 2d 350, 489 N.E.2d 1374 (1986) and Dethloff v. Ziegler Coal Co., 82 Ill. 2d 393,
412 N.E.2d 526 (1980)). Punitive damages normally are appropriate for torts committed
with actual malice. Id. at 974, 505 N.E.2d at 712. However, because actual malice is
essential to a libel action brought by a public official, punitive damages are not permitted
in such a case. Id. at 976, 505 N.E.2d at 713.
136. Id. at 976, 505 N.E.2d at 713-14. Compensatory damages awarded must be rea-
sonably related to the actual harm suffered. Id. at 976, 505 N.E.2d at 713. At trial, Cos-
tello did not testify on the issue of whether he incurred any actual harm. Id. However,
Costello's wife stated that he was distraught and humiliated by the defendants' editorial.
Id. at 976, 505 N.E.2d at 713-14. Other witnesses testified regarding Costello's reputation
in the community. Id. at 976, 505 N.E.2d at 714. Based on this testimony, the court
reduced Costello's damage award to more accurately reflect the extent of harm he actu-
ally suffered. Id.
137. Id. at 976-77, 505 N.E.2d at 714 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 979, 505 N.E.2d at 715 (Steigmann, J., dissenting) (citing Owen, 113 Ill.
2d at 280, 497 N.E.2d at 1148).
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tinguish opinion from fact, despite the difficulty of the task.' 39 Be-
cause Illinois precedent did not provide clear guidelines on the
mechanics of separating opinion from fact, the dissent advocated
adopting the Ollman factors. '40 Applying these factors to the facts
in Costello, the dissent determined that the editorial was opinion 4'
entitled to absolute constitutional protection.' 42
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Opinion
The supreme court in Costello first considered whether the de-
fendants' editorial statements were libelous per se. 143 The court
stated that statements accusing the plaintiff of incapacity or wrong-
doing "in words so obviously and naturally harmful that they are
actionable without proof of special damages" are libelous per se.144
This rule does not apply, however, to statements reasonably sus-
ceptible to an innocent construction. 4  The court applied these
principles and concluded that the editorial was libelous per se, be-
cause it charged Costello with a lack of integrity in discharging his
public duties and could not be innocently construed.1 46
The court then rejected the defendants' contention that the edi-
torial's allegations were substantially true.' 47 Specifically, the edi-
torial alleged that the county board was authorized to conduct a
binding referendum on the transit district issue; in fact, the board
had the power to conduct only an advisory referendum. 4  Addi-
139. Id. at 979-80, 505 N.E.2d at 715-16 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 983, 505 N.E.2d at 718 (Steigmann, J., dissenting). Whether a statement is
constitutionally protected opinion depends upon its: (1) precision, (2) verifiability, (3) lit-
erary context, and (4) public context. Olman, 750 F.2d at 979; see also supra text accom-
panying note 68.
141. Costello, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 990-93, 505 N.E.2d at 723-24 (Steigmann, J., dis-
senting). Justice Steigmann found that a statement's presence on an editorial page,
although not dispositive, is a highly significant factor in determining whether it is pro-
tected opinion. Id. at 991-92, 505 N.E.2d at 723 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1001, 505 N.E.2d at 729 (Steigmann, J., dissenting). Justice Steigmann
concluded, "The Belleville News-Democrat may be a scandal sheet ... and the investiga-
tion and reporting that lead [sic] to the litigation in this case may be a disgrace to journal-
ism; however, as long as the allegedly defamatory statements in this case are opinion, not
fact, none of these other factors matter." Id. (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
143. Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 414, 532 N.E.2d at 795.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 417, 532 N.E.2d at 796; see also supra note 90.
147. Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 417, 532 N.E.2d at 796; see also Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967) ("[tlruth has become an absolute defense in almost all
[libel] cases"); American Int'l Hosp. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 136 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1022,
483 N.E.2d 965, 968 (1st Dist. 1985) ("[t]ruth is a valid defense in a defamation action").
148. Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 417, 532 N.E.2d at 796. A county board has the authority
to initiate a referendum. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 28-5 (1987). However,
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tionally, the editorial erroneously reported that the board voted to
impose a sales tax; in truth, the board vote merely created a transit
district. ' 49 The court also found that Costello exerted considerable
effort to defeat the transit district resolution, contrary to the edito-
rial's assertion that he had done "absolutely nothing" to protect
the taxpayers' interests. 50 Thus, the court found convincing evi-
dence that the statements in the editorial were, in fact, false.' 5'
The court acknowledged the defendants' contention that opin-
ions receive absolute first amendment protection.1 52 The court de-
termined, however, that it need not address this issue, because
Costello, a public official, failed to prove actual malice with clear
and convincing evidence.1 3 The court reasoned that the actual
malice standard is subjective, and therefore requires proof that the
defamation defendant actually knew that his statements were false,
or at least seriously doubted their validity." 4 Thus, the trial
court's finding that the defendants subjectively believed that Cos-
tello had lied, contradicted its conclusion that the defendants acted
with actual malice. 1 5
The supreme court concluded that Costello failed to establish
with clear and convincing evidence that the defendants knew or
entertained serious doubts regarding the veracity of their asser-
tions. 56 Because a public official must prove actual malice with
convincing clarity to recover damages in a defamation action, the
court reversed the judgments below." 7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Costello Implicitly Rejects Absolute Protection of Opinion
The appellate court in Costello disregarded the Illinois Supreme
"[q]uestions of public policy which have any legal effect shall be submitted to referendum
only as authorized by a statute which so provides or by the [Illinois] Constitution." Id.
para. 28-1. A referendum not so authorized is merely advisory. Id.
149. Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 417, 532 N.E.2d at 796.
150. Id. at 418, 532 N.E.2d at 797.
151. Id. at 417-18, 532 N.E.2d at 797.
152. Id. at 418, 532 N.E.2d at 797.
153. Id. at 418-19, 532 N.E.2d at 797 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964)); see also supra note 32.
154. Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 418-19, 532 N.E.2d at 797.
155. Id. at 421, 532 N.E.2d at 798.
156. Id. at 425-26, 532 N.E.2d at 800. Specifically, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
convincingly that, prior to publishing the editorial, the defendants knew about Costello's
efforts to table the transit district resolution. Without such knowledge, the defendants
could not have published the editorial with actual malice. Id.
157. Id. at 426, 532 N.E.2d at 801.
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Court's mandate, announced less than six months earlier in Owen
v. Carr, 15 that defamation defendants must be afforded absolute
constitutional protection for statements of opinion.'5 9 Obviously,
the appellate court could not reconcile its conclusion that the edi-
torial was libelous per se with the Owen court's directive that all
opinions are constitutionally privileged. This left the appellate
court with two options: reexamining its reasoning or ignoring the
directive. It chose the latter.160
The appellate court justified its conclusion by finding the "line"
between fact and opinion difficult to define and, therefore, not
worth defining.' 6' Further, the court dismissed the constitutional
basis of Owen as mere dicta.' 62 In effect, the opinion below chal-
lenged the Illinois Supreme Court to reaffirm its recognition in
Owen that opinion is afforded absolute constitutional protection.
The supreme court, however, completely skirted this issue. 163
Had the court merely acknowledged the difficulty of resolving the
opinion versus fact dichotomy, it would have preserved the integ-
rity of its decision in Owen. By its silence, the court implied that
constitutional protection of opinion remains a debatable issue in
Illinois. If so, this conclusion contradicts the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment", and ig-
nores the court's duty to enforce constitutional standards. 65
Ultimately, Costello will adversely affect the public's ability to
monitor and criticize elected officials. The right to speak freely on
issues of public concern166 and to use the press as a medium for
political discussion 67 are the tools with which citizens perform
their necessary function. These rights are not implied merely from
158. 113 I11. 2d 273, 280, 497 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (1986).
159. Id. at 280, 497 N.E.2d at 1147. "[Tlhe Supreme Court has recognized a consti-
tutional privilege for expressions of opinion .... [Tihe involved language must be consid-
ered in context to determine whether the statement should be construed to be an
expression of opinion." Id. (emphasis added).
160. See Costello, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 965-67, 505 N.E.2d at 707-08.
161. Id. at 965, 505 N.E.2d at 706.
162. Id. at 966, 505 N.E.2d at 707; see also supra note 159.
163. See Costello, 125 Ill. 2d at 418, 532 N.E.2d at 797.
164. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (extending abso-
lute protection to statements of opinion under the first amendment); see also supra text
accompanying notes 58-60.
165. Costello, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 997, 505 N.E.2d at 727 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
166. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (suggesting that
an allegedly defamatory communication discussing an issue of public interest and con-
cern does not lose constitutional protection merely because it is made in the form of a
paid advertisement).
167. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring) (individuals and
publishers have an absolute right to criticize public officials and discuss public affairs).
1990]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 21
constitutional language; freedom of speech and the press are enu-
merated explicitly in the first amendment. 168
Further, the first amendment's protection of public criticism
serves as a quid pro quo for the absolute privilege afforded many
federal and state officials for utterances made within the confines of
their official duties. 169  Assuming that the corresponding first
amendment privilege of the citizen-critic is limited to expressions
of opinion, 70 judicial difficulty in defining the proper standard as
to what constitutes an opinion does not justify denying a constitu-
tional right. The factors enunciated in Olman provide significant
guidance to courts in making this determination.' 7 ' As courts ad-
But see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (limiting the actual malice standard to statements di-
rected toward public officials and public figures).
168. The first amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Courts seem reluc-
tant to enforce these explicit guarantees of citizenship, yet are quite willing to infer other
rights whose origins are not readily apparent. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-85 (1965) (discovering a right to "privacy" within the "penumbra" created by
the Bill of Rights).
169. Article I of the Constitution provides in pertinent part, "Senators and Repre-
sentatives shall . . . be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech
or Debate in either House they shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 6. The Supreme Court has extended this "absolute" privilege to judges, Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871), and executive officers exercising appropriate
discretion, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1959). Executive officials receive only
"limited" immunity, however, in suits alleging constitutional violations. Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U.S. 478, 505-08 (1978).
The Illinois Constitution abolished sovereign immunity "[e]xcept as the General As-
sembly may provide by law." ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4. The Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 1-101 to
10-101 (1987), was designed "to protect local public entities and public employees from
liability arising from the operation of government." Id. para. 1-101. l(a). Specifically, the
Act insulates local public entities from all defamation actions. Id. para. 2-107. Addition-
ally, local public entities may defend or indemnify any employee for an act or omission
occurring within the scope of his employment. Id. para. 2-302.
170. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. But see New York Times, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J.,
concurring) (characterizing criticism of government officials as an "absolute, uncondi-
tional constitutional right," regardless of whether a such criticism is labeled "opinion" or
"fact").
171. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985); see also supra text accompanying notes 60-68. Admittedly, some
doubts must be raised regarding standards which afford an imprecise, unverifiable state-
ment greater constitutional protection than a well crafted one. The New York Times court
stated, "Criticism of... official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely
because it is effective criticism .... " New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273. This argument,
however, fails to recognize that truth is generally accepted as an absolute defense in a
defamation action. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967); see also
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dress cases with varying fact patterns, these flexible factors can be
adjusted to enhance their reliability in determining whether a state-
ment is opinion or fact in a given situation.
Freedom to discuss public affairs and the performance of public
officials lies at the very heart of the first amendment.172 The Con-
stitution expressly prohibits state courts from limiting these
rights. 73 Because Costello effectively chills these first amendment
privileges by casting doubt upon the protection afforded statements
of opinion, it violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Constitution.
B. The Impact of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
A "survey" of the law is merely a snapshot in the legal develop-
supra note 147. Thus, as a statement's precision increases, it may lose the constitutional
protection accorded an "opinion" but gain truth as an absolute common law defense.
Nevertheless, the Ollman factors are flexible enough to at least provide courts with a
starting point for analysis. Thus, in applying these factors to an allegedly defamatory
newspaper editorial, a court may give the literary and public contexts of the writing
greater weight than its precision and verifiability. Under such a construction, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that a newspaper editorial, printed on a page labelled "OPINIONS" and
"Our Viewpoint," could be construed by an "average reader" as anything other than an
opinion. See Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979. But see Costello, 125 I11. 2d at 417, 532 N.E.2d at
796. For a detailed analysis of the Ollman factors and possible variations, see Note, The
Fact-Opinion Determination in Defamation, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1988).
172. See New York Times, 276 U.S. at 296-97 (Black, J., concurring) ("[flreedom to
discuss public affairs and public officials is unquestionably... the kind of speech the First
Amendment was designed to keep within the area of free discussion"). Indeed, the Cos-
tello decision becomes even more untenable when one considers the importance the Foun-
ders placed on a free press. Although initially critical of newspapers, Thomas Jefferson
came to believe that
[t]he basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should
have a government without newpapers or newspapers without government, I
should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787, in 11 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 48-49 (J. Boyd, ed. 1955).
Benjamin Franklin convinced Andrew Hamilton to defend the immigrant printer John
Peter Zenger, who was being tried under the sedition laws for printing a criticism of the
governor. One commentator suggests that Hamilton's successful defense served as a foun-
dation for the drafting of the first amendment. See Introduction, PRESS FREEDOMS
UNDER PRESSURE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS 4 (1972).
173. Article VI of the Constitution provides in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
judges in every State shall be bounded thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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ment of a jurisdiction. The significance of a particular case that
was decided during the survey period may seem to diminish with
time, its issues left dormant until reawakened by a new set of cir-
cumstances. Such circumstances found themselves before the
Supreme Court of the United States this past summer in Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co. 174
In Milkovich, plaintiff was a high school wrestling coach whose
team and its fans were involved in an altercation with members of
an opposing team. 75 Plaintiff's actions during the meet allegedly
caused the fracas. 176 Following an administrative hearing before
Ohio High School Athletic Association ("OHSAA"), plaintiff's
team was placed on probation. 177 A state court, however, found
that the administrative hearing violated due process requirements
and the court enjoined OHSAA from enforcing the penalty against
plaintiff's team. 17 Plaintiff testified at both the administrative and
court hearings. 79
The day after the court issued its injunction, an editorial in de-
fendants' newspaper accused plaintiff of lying.'8 0 Plaintiff brought
a defamation action, alleging that the editorial accused him of per-
jury."'8 Following complex litigation that extended over a fourteen
year period, 8 2 the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
174. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
175. Id. at 2698 n.2.
176. Id. at 2698.
177. Id.
178. Barrett v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, No. 74 Civ. 09-3390 (Ohio C.P.
Franklin Jan. 7, 1975).
179. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698.
180. Id. A photograph of the editorial's author appeared in the column, along with
the caption, "TD says." The headline read, "'Maple beat the law with the big lie.' " The
article stated: " '[A] lesson was learned ... yesterday by the students of Maple Heights
High School .... If you get in a jam, lie your way out .... Milkovich . . . lied at the
[court] hearing after ... having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.' " Id. n.2.
181. Id. at 2699.
182. See id. at 2698-2701. The Ohio Court of Common Pleas initially directed a ver-
dict for defendants on the grounds that plaintiff failed to prove actual malice. The Ohio
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that plaintiff made a sufficient showing
of actual malice. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 416 N.E.2d 662
(1979). The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed defendants' subsequent appeal for lack of a
substantial constitutional question, and the United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966 (1980).
On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding both
that the editorial was constitutionally protected opinion and that plaintiff failed to make a
prima facie showing of actual malice. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded, holding as a matter of law that the
statements in the editorial were "factual assertions," and thus were not constitutionally
protected. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196-97
(1984). Further, the court held that plaintiff was not a public official or figure, and there-
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summary judgment for defendants. 183 The appellate court based
its ruling on the Gertz dicta, finding that "as a matter of law.., the
article was constitutionally protected opinion."184  The Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's appeal,'8" and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 86
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, traced the his-
tory of constitutional limitations on state defamation law. This his-
torical discourse yielded six "established safeguards" under the
first amendment. 8 7 First, the majority confirmed the requirement
that public officials and figures must prove actual malice in order
to recover in a defamation action. 188 Additionally, the Court reit-
erated that states cannot impose liability for defamation without a
showing of fault. 189 Third, the Court stated that presumed or puni-
tive damages are unavailable to a defamation plaintiff absent a
showing of actual malice.'9° Fourth, the majority reaffirmed that a
defamation plaintiff bears the burden of proving both fault and fal-
sity against a media defendant. 19' Fifth, certain "types" of speech,
such as "'rhetorical hyperbole,'" parody, and language used "'in
a loose, figurative sense,' " are immune from defamation actions.192
Finally, the Court emphasized that first amendment issues require
an appellate court to review independently the entire record as an
fore was not subject to the actual malice standard. Id. at 294-99, 473 N.E.2d at 1193-96.
The United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Lorain Journal Co. v.
Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
In the interim, H. Donald Scott, the superintendent of schools at the time of the wres-
tling meet incident, was pursuing his own defamation action in the Ohio courts. Scott
allegedly had been defamed in the same editorial as that at issue in Milkovich. In Scott's
case, however, the Ohio Supreme Court ultimately determined that defendants' editorial
was constitutionally protected opinion, and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment
against Scott. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986). The Ohio
Court of Appeals thus "consider[ed] itself bound by the... decision in Scott" when it
rendered its final decision in the Milkovich case. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110
S. Ct. 2695, 2701 (1990).
183. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 545 N.E.2d 1320 (1989).
184. Id. at 23, 545 N.E.2d at 1324.
185. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2701 (1990).
186. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990).
187. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703-05.
188. Id. at 2703-04 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
189. Id. at 2704 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974)).
190. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350).
191. Id. (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986)).
192. Id. at 2704-05 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988),
and quoting Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974) and Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 395 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970)).
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additional safeguard to free expression. 193
The majority concluded that these six rules "adequately se-
cure[" an individual's first amendment freedoms, thereby render-
ing it unnecessary to "create a wholesale defamation exemption for
anything that might be labeled 'opinion.' "194 Thus, according to
the Court, the dispositive issue in Milkovich was not whether the
allegedly defamatory statements in the editorial were opinions, but
rather "whether ... a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
statements in the ...column could imply an assertion that ...
Milkovich perjured himself ... ."9' Because such an inference
reasonably could be drawn from the editorial at issue, and because
such an inference was "sufficiently factual to be susceptible of be-
ing proved true or false," the Court reversed and remanded. 196
C. Tracking the Elusive "False Idea"
It follows from Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Milkovich
that the emphasis in determining the scope of first amendment pro-
tection afforded the press has shifted. No longer will courts strug-
gle to determine whether an allegedly defamatory statement is
constitutionally protected opinion. Rather, they will struggle to as-
certain whether or not "a statement of opinion relating to matters
of public concern... contain[s] a provably false factual connotation
.... ,,19 Additionally, Milkovich makes clear that when a factual
assertion reasonably can be inferred from a statement - even a
statement of opinion - a cause of action for defamation will not be
deemed constitutionally repugnant. 98
As pointed out by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion,
however, the majority reached its decision in Milkovich by using
the very same analysis previously used by many courts in unlock-
ing the fact versus opinion dichotomy. 99 Specifically, the dissent
stated:
Among the circumstances to be scrutinized by a court in ascer-
taining whether a statement purports to state or imply facts
about an individual, as shown by the Court's analysis of the state-
193. Id. at 2705 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 499 (1984)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2707 (emphasis added).
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. See id. at 2706 (emphasis added).
198. "[E]xpressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact." Id. at
2705.
199. Id. at 2708-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ments at issue here, . . . are the same indicia that lower courts
have been relying on for the past decade or so to distinguish be-
tween statements of fact and statements of opinion: the type of
language used, the meaning of the statement in context, whether
the statement is verifiable, and the broader social circumstances
in which the statement was made.2°°
Justice Brennan's reference to the Olman factors is evidence
that Milkovich decided nothing. Rather, the Court merely changed
the form of the constitutional inquiry without changing its sub-
stance. Courts, instead of protecting statements of "opinion," are
now required to protect statements that are "not provably false, ' 20 1
and that do not state or imply defamatory "facts. ' 20 2 Thus, the
focus will be on finding an actionable "fact," rather than a pro-
tected "opinion."
The danger of Milkovich is its emphasis on facts that reasonably
may be inferred from statements of opinion. Any well-written
opinion relies upon underlying facts. The conscientious critic now
faces the possibility of a defamation action not only for the ideas he
actually expresses, but for the factual foundations of those ideas.
According to Milkovich, if an author's factual foundations ulti-
mately prove to be incorrect, the opinions expressed in his writing
are actionable.203 Thus, under the Milkovich rationale, there can
be "such a thing as a false idea. ' '204
V. CONCLUSION
Costello's implicit rejection of absolute protection of opinion
under the first amendment seems - at first glance - unimportant
in light of the Milkovich decsion. Under Milkovich, whether a
statement is one of "opinion" is irrelevant in the constitutional
analysis. Thus, Costello's decision to ignore the fact versus opinion
dichotomy appears to be correct.
As this Note points out, however, Milkovich merely changes the
focus of the constitutional inquiry. A court must now seek an ac-
tionable "fact," rather than a protected "opinion," in assessing
200. Id. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)).
201. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the falsity of allegedly defamatory
statements made by a media defendant. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 777 (1986). Justice Brennan asserted that this rule should apply in all defama-
tion cases, not just those brought against a media defendant. Id. at 780 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
202. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
203. See id.
204. But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
1990]
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whether speech is privileged under the first amendment. As Justice
Brennan stated in his dissent in Mikovich, the analysis used in this
assessment is identical to that used previously in unraveling the
fact versus opinion dichotomy. Thus, Milkovich changes only the
form, not the substance, of first amendment protection.
More importantly, however, the rationale underlying Costello
and Milkovich demonstrates a failure to understand the concerns
expressed by James Madison and quoted at the opening of this
Note. 20 5 Free expression of one's opinions on issues of public con-
cern is a central first amendment right. Such opinions are often
inseparable from the facts upon which they are based. Costello,
however, simply ignores the fact versus opinion dichotomy;
Milkovich permits actionable facts to be inferred from statements
of opinion. Both cases set dangerous precedents that erode crucial
first amendment freedoms.
THOMAS J. PAULOSKI
205. See infra text accompanying note 1.
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